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Abstract
We propose a group key agreement protocol in this 
paper.  The key agreement protocol is a good solution 
to establish a common session key for communication.  
But in a group of member’s communication, we not 
only need to establish a common session key, but also 
need to concern the member changing environment.  
The proposed protocol is based on weil pairing, 
ID-based authentication and a complete binary tree 
architecture.  The users in the group will establish a 
common session key.  If there are users want to join or 
leave the group, our protocol can reconstruct a new 
common session key for security considerations.  
Furthermore, our proposed protocol is efficiency when 
the group member is small and dynamic changing.      
1. Introduction 
It is important to assure security in the group 
communication environment.  A secure group 
communication should provide communicate 
confidentially among users in the group, that is, the 
messages during communication should not be known 
by users outside the group and the users in the group 
can join or leave dynamically during the 
communication.  It needs a session key to encrypt the 
transmitted messages.  There are two technologies to 
generate a session key for confidence: the key 
distribution and the key agreement.  In key 
distribution, it needs a group controller to hold the 
information of entire users in the group, if the group 
controller is crashed or attacked, then the group break 
down.  While the group member is dynamic changing, 
the group controller may be inefficiency in this 
environment.   
In contrast, key agreement does not need the group 
controller; all users in the group generate the session 
key by key agreement.  The session key includes 
information of all users so that no user can control or 
forecast it.   
Diffie-Hellman key agreement [3] is the first key 
agreement protocol.  It can assure the security of 
communication between the two users.  But it does 
not authenticate users, hence suffers the 
“man-in-the-middle” attack.   
Joux [4] gave another direction of key agreement.  
He implements a tripartite key agreement protocol 
using weil pairing.  When three users want to agree a 
common session key, only one message must be 
delivered by each user in the protocol.  However, 
Joux’s protocol still does not authenticate the users, and 
is vulnerable to “man-in-the-middle” attack.   
With authentication, Shamir [6] proposed an 
identity-based encryption and signature scheme.  It 
provides authentication without CA.  In the scheme, it 
uses identity information as user’s public key, and so 
that it is not need to verify user’s public key.  It needs 
a KGC (Key Generation Center) to be responsible to 
generate user’s private key from user’s identity.  Since 
then, there are many ID-based encryptsystem have 
been proposed [1,2,7,8].   
In this paper, we propose a group key agreement 
protocol based on weil pairing.  In our protocol, we 
use the ID-based architecture to authenticate the 
received messages and the users in the group.  If there 
are some users want to join or leave the group, not all 
users in the group need to renew their secret key, it is 
suit for dynamic changing environment.     
This paper is organized as followings: Section 2 
proposes the notation and assumption in this paper.  
Section 3 is the proposed protocol.  We show the 
analysis of some security properties that we concerned 
in section 4.  Section 5 describes the comparison of 
computation overhead with other protocol.  Finally, 
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section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Notation and assumption 
Let G1 be an additive group with a prime order q,
and G2 to be a multiplicative group with the same order.  
P is an arbitrary generator of G1.   
We assume that the discrete logarithm problem 
(DLP) is hard in G1 and G2. e is a bilinear mapping 
between two groups (e: G1 u G1 o G2).  It must 
satisfy the following properties: 
1. Bilinear: for all P, Q  G1 and a, b  Zq* , we 
have e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab.
2. Non-degenerate: if P is a generator of G1, then e(P,
P) is a generator of G2 .  
3. Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to 
compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q  G1.
For using bilinear mappings to implement the 
protocol, there are some problems and assumptions [5] 
as followings: 
1. DDH (Decisional Diffie-Hellman) Problem in G1:
Given (P, aP, bP, cP) for some a, b and c 
Zq*, decides if c = ab mod q.  The DDH problem 
can be solved in polynomial time by e(aP, bP) = 
e(cP, P).   
DDH assumption:  
There is no polynomial time algorithm to 
solve the DDH problem in G2.
2. HDH (Hash Dicisional Diffie-Hellman) Problem 
in G1:
Given (P, aP, bP, c) and a hash function H1:
G1 o Zq*, decides if c = H1(abP) mod q.
HDH assumption:  
There is no polynomial time algorithm to 
solve the HDH problem in G1.
3. BDH (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman) Problem: 
Given (P, aP, bP, cP), computes e(P, P)abc.
BDH assumption:  
There is no polynomial time algorithm to 
solve the BDH problem. 
4. DHBDH (Decisional Hash Bilinear Diffie- 
Hellman) Problem: 
Given (P, aP, bP, cP, d) and a hash function 
H2: G2 o Zq*, decides if d = H2(e(P, P)abc) mod q.
DHBDH assumption:  
There is no polynomial time algorithm to 
solve the DHBDH problem. 
3. The proposed protocol 
In this section, we propose our new protocol.  We 
divide our protocol into three phases: the initial phase, 
the key agreement phase and the member changing 
phase.  In order to perform ID-based authentication, 
each user need to register to the KGC (Key Generation 
Center) in initial phase.  Key agreement phase 
describes how members in the group to agree a 
common session key.  Membership changing phase 
shows what should be done if members join or leave 
the group.  We need some system parameters in our 
protocol, we show the definitions in Table 1.   
Table 1. The system parameters
G1 An additive group with prime order q.
G2 A multiplicative group with the same order q.
P A generator of G1.
si The short term private key of users, 1  i  n.
i Each user is in the name of integer i, 1  i  n.
H A cryptographic hash function, H: {0, 1}* o G1.
H1 A cryptographic hash function, H1: G1 o Zq*.
H2 A cryptographic hash function, H2: G2 o Zq*.
H3 A cryptographic hash function,  
H3: G1 u G1 o Zq*.
ki The common value of users i, 2i (if user i has left
child only) or i, 2i, 2i + 1 (if user i has two 
children). 
IDi The identity of the user i, IDi  {0, 1}*, 1in.
KGC The key generation center, it is responsible for 
ID-based authentication. 
Qi The long-term public key of user i, Qi = H(IDi).
Si The long-term private key of user i, Si = sQi.
s It is chosen from Zq* by KGC.  The KGC must 
keeps s as secret and treats it as the master key. 
Ppub The public key of KGC, Ppub = sP.
3.1 The initial phase 
We show that how each user registers to the KGC,
and get their private key.  They only need to process 
this phase one time.  After that, every member can 
process the key agreement phase to compute the 
common session key.   
The KGC selects a random number s form Zq* and 
computes Ppub = sP.  The KGC publishes Ppub as a 
system parameter and keeps s secretly, where s is the 
master key.   
Each user Ui’s identity is IDi  {0, 1}* and their 
long-term public key is Qi = H(IDi).  They use Qi to 
register to the KGC in secure channel by the following 
steps:   
Step 1: User Ui sends Qi to KGC.
Step 2: KGC compute user Ui’s long-term private 
key Si = sQi and sends back to Ui.   
The public system parameters are (G1, G2, e, q, P,
Ppub, H, H1, H2, H3).   
3.2 The key agreement phase 
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In this subsection, we show that how legal users 
cooperate to compute a common session key.  In our 
protocol, the key agreement process is based on 
complete binary tree architecture.  Each nodes in that 
tree is representing one user, Figure 1 is an example of 
15 users.   
Figure 1. A complete binary tree of a group with 15 users
Assume there are n user in this group, every user Ui
( i{1,..,n}) holds their long-term public key Qi , 
long-term private key Si , and they will choose one 
random number si as short-term private key.   
There are three kinds of nodes in a complete binary 
tree: the leaf node, the internal node with one left child 
only and the internal node with two children.  
Case 1: If the node is a leaf (2i > n)
Step 1: Set ti = si.
Step 2: User Ui broadcasts tiP to all users in the 
group.   
Case 2: If the node only has one left child (2i = n)
Step 1: User Ui selects another random number sic
additionally.   
Step 2: User Ui sends messages (Pi, Pic, Ti) to the 
user U2i, where Pi=siP, Pic=sicP and 
Ti=H3(Pi, Pic) Si + siPic.   
User U2i sends messages (P2i, T2i) to the user 
Ui, where P2i = s2iP and T2i =H1 (P2i) S2i + 
s2iP2i.   
Step 3: User Ui verifies the following equation:  
e(T2i, P) = e(P2i, P2i) e(H1(P2i)Q2i, Ppub).  
User U2i verifies the following equation:  
e(Ti, P) = e(Pi, Pi) e(H3(Pi, Pic)Qi, Ppub).  
Step 4: If the equation in step 3 holds, the user Ui
computes ki = e(sicP, P2i)si , and the user U2i
computes ki = e(Pi, Pic)s2i , where   
ki = e(sicP, P2i)si = e(Pi, Pic)s2i
= e(P, P)sisics2i .
Step 5: If i = 1, then session key is ki, else set ti = 
H2(ki) and User Ui broadcasts tiP to all users 
in the group.   
Case 3: If the node has two children   
Step 1: User Ui sends messages (Pi, Ti) to user U2i
and U2i+1, where Pi =siP and Ti =H1(Pi)Si + 
siPi.   
User U2i sends messages (P2i, T2i) to user Ui
and U2i+1, where P2i=s2iP and T2i= H1(P2i)S2i
+ s2iP2i.   
User U2i+1 sends messages (P2i+1, T2i+1) to 
user Ui and U2i, where P2i+1 = s2i+1P and  
T2i+1 = H1(P2i+1) S2i+1 + s2i+1P2i+1.   
Step 2: User Ui verifies   
e(T2i + T2i+1, P) = e(P2i, P2i) e(P2i+1, P2i+1)u
e(H1(P2i) Q2i + H1(P2i+1) Q2i+1, Ppub).  
User U2i verifies  
e(Ti + T2i+1, P) = e(Pi, Pi) e(P2i+1, P2i+1)u
e(H1(Pi) Qi + H1(P2i+1) Q2i+1, Ppub).  
User U2i+1 verifies  
e(Ti + T2i, P) = e(Pi, Pi) e(P2i, P2i) u
e(H1(Pi) Qi + H1(P2i) Q2i, Ppub).  
Step 3: If the equation in step 2 holds, then the user 
Ui computes ki = e(P2i, P2i+1)si , the user U2i
computes ki = e(Pi, P2i+1)s2i and the user U2i+1
computes ki = e(Pi, P2i)s2i+1 , where 
ki = e(P2i, P2i+1)si = e(Pi, P2i+1)s2i
= e(Pi, P2i)s2i+1 = e(P, P)sis2is2i+1 .   
Step 4: If i = 1, then the session key is ki, else set  
ti = H2(ki) and User Ui broadcasts tiP to all 
users in the group.  
Each user performs the procedure above until 
reaching the root, thus all users in the group can get a 
common session key k1 .   
3.3 The member changing phase 
It is possible that users may join or leave the group 
during the communication.  For the security 
considerations, the users before joining and after 
leaving the group cannot get the messages delivered in 
the group.  Therefore it must perform some 
procedures if there are users want to join or leave the 
group.  
3.2.1 Join protocol.  Assume there are n users in the 
group originally.  The newcomer will be inserting in 
the position of n + 1 of the complete binary tree.  He 
will process the following steps:   
Step 1: User Un+1 (the newcomer) gets the 
information of the group from User U1, the 
information contains the number of the users in 
the group and the public key of all users.  
Step 2: User Un+1 selects sn+1  Zq* as his short-term 
private key, and broadcasts Pn+1 = sn+1P and
Tn+1 = H1(Pn+1) Sn+1 + sn+1Pn+1 (for authenticate 
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Pn+1).   
Step 3: Upon receiving Pn+1 and Tn+1, each user 
authenticate Pn+1 with Tn+1.   
Step 4: New session key generation.  Each value ki
on the node i on the path from n+1 to 1(root) 
will change.   
When the user Un+1 join into the group, there are 
two cases in the original group: n (the number of users 
in the original group) is even or odd.  If n is even, it 
means that the last parent in the binary tree has two 
children after the user Un+1 join in.  If n is odd, then 
the last parent has only one left children.  In this case, 
the last parent must pick another random number to 
complete key refreshing.   
Case 1: If n is even  
Let i = n/2, then the user Ui computes ki = 
e(P2i, Pn+1)si , the user U2i computes ki = e(Pi,
Pn+1)s2i and the user Un+1 computes ki = e(Pi,
P2i)sn+1 , where  
ki = e(P2i, Pn+1)si = e(Pi, Pn+1)s2i
= e(Pi, P2i)sn+1 = e(P, P)sis2isn+1 .   
If i = 1, then the new session key is k1, else Ui
sets ti = H(ki), broadcasts Pi = tiP, and performs 
the key agreement phase in subsection 3.2 until 
reach the root.  Figure 2 is an example when U15
join the group, the values k7 , k3 and k1 will 
change.   
Figure 2. There are 14 (even) users in the group originally, 
the 15-th node is the newcomer.
Case 2: If n is odd  
Let i = (n+1)/2, the user Ui selects sic  Zq*,
and broadcasts Pic = sicP and Tic = H1(Pi) Si + siPi
(for authenticate Pic).  Then the user Ui computes
ki = e(Pic, Pn+1)si and the user Un+1 computes ki = 
e(Pi, Pic)sn+1 , where    
ki = e(Pic, Pn+1)si = e(Pi, Pic)sn+1
= e(P, P)sisicsn+1 .  
If i = 1, then the new session key is k1, else Ui
sets ti = H(ki), broadcasts Pi = tiP, performs the 
key agreement phase in subsection 3.2 until reach 
the root. Figure 3 is an example when U14 join the 
group, the values k7 , k3 and k1 will change.   
Figure 3. There are 13 (odd) users in the group originally, 
the 14-th node is the newcomer. 
3.2.2 Leave protocol.  Assume there are n users in the 
group originally.  Let the leaving user is Ul, exchange 
the position of Ul and Un, then delete Ul, and compute 
the new session key.  According to the position of Ul,
there are three cases be concerned.  While l = n (Case 
1), it means that the leaving user is the last node in the 
binary tree.  The protocol can delete the last node (Un)
directly, and generates a new common session key.  If 
l = 1 (Case 2), it means that the position of the leaving 
user is the root of the binary tree.  In the case, the 
protocol deletes the root node (U1), then replaces the 
root with the last node (Un) and generates a new 
common session key.  While l not equate to 1 or n
(Case 3), the protocol replaces Ul with Un (the last node 
in the binary tree), then generates a new common 
session key of the group.  We show the processes of 
each case in the following:   
Case 1: If l = n
(i) If n is odd  
Let i = (n-1)/2, the user Ui selects sic  Zq*,
and broadcasts Pic = sicP and Tic = H1(Pi) Si + 
siPi (for authenticate Pic).  Then the user Ui
computes ki = e(Pic, Pn-1)si and the user Un-1
computes ki = e(Pi, Pic)sn-1 , where   
ki = e(Pic, Pn-1)si = e(Pi, Pic)sn-1
= e(P, P)sisicsn-1 .  
If i = 1, then the new session key is k1, else 
Ui sets ti = H(ki), broadcasts Pi = tiP, performs 
the key agreement phase in subsection 3.2 until 
reach the root.    
(ii) If n is even 
Let i = n/2, the user Ui selects sicZq*,
replaces ti with sic, then broadcasts Pic = sicP and
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Tic = H1(Pi) Si + siPi (for authenticating Pic).  
User Ui refreshes ki , performs the key 
agreement phase in subsection 3.2 until reach 
the root.   
Case 2: If l = 1  
The protocol replaces U1 with Un, and 
performs the case 1.  Figure 4 is the example 
when there are 15 users in the group originally 
and U1 is leaving.     
Case 3: If l  2, …, n-1 
The protocol replaces Ul with Un, and 
performs the case 1.   
Figure 4. The leaving node is 1st node, replaced root by the 
last node 15. 
4. Security analysis 
We show the analysis of some security properties 
that we concerned in our proposed protocol.  Those 
security properties are as following: key authentication, 
forward secrecy, key compromise, known session key 
security and key control.       
(1) Key authentication:  
The property of implicit key authentication to a 
user A is that no other users except A wants to agree 
upon can compute a particular key.   
In our protocol, if user A wants to agree upon user 
B, then B must get the information from A to compute 
the particular key.  By the ID-based authentication 
architecture, user B can verify the message that user 
A send.  Without A’s information, no one can 
compute a particular key.  It is clear that our 
protocol provide key authentication.   
(2) Forward secrecy: 
The property of forward secrecy is that if the 
compromise of any long-term private key of users 
does not affect the security of previous session keys.  
In our protocol, the compromise of certain 
long-term private key gives no information about the 
session key, since the session key does not compute 
from long-term private key.  The long-term private 
key is for authentication in the protocol.  It shows 
that our protocol provide the forward secrecy.   
(3) Key compromise:  
The property of key compromise is that 
compromise of one user’s long-term private key does 
not imply the other users’ long-term private key.   
In our protocol, each user’s long term private 
key is chosen individually, so even the adversary 
have got the long term private key of a certain user, 
he still cannot imply the long term private key of 
other users.   
(4) Known session key security:  
The property of known key security is that the 
compromise of one session key should not affect the 
security of the current run of the protocol.   
Suppose that there are three users U1, U2 and U3
in the group, and the previous session key is kprev = 
e(P2, P3)s1 = e(P1, P3)s2 = e(P1, P2)s3 = e(P, P)s1s2s3, if 
the adversary wants to extract certain short term 
private key (e.g. s3), then the adversary must face the 
BDHP in G2, which is supposed to be hard.   
(5) Key control:  
The property of key control is that there is no user 
in the group can influence or control the value of the 
session key.   
In our protocol, the common session key is 
determined by all users in the group, and no one can 
control or pre-determinate the session key.   
5. Performance 
We compare the computation of our protocol with 
authentication version of Barua et al.’s protocol [5] as 
Table 2.  In their protocol, they also use a key tree 
structure.  But each user is represented in the leaf 
node, every user need to hold the secret value from leaf 
node to the root.  In our proposed protocol, we use a 
complete binary tree structure.  Each node in the tree 
represent one user, we try to reduce the amount of 
secret value.    
Table 2. The comparison of computational overhead 
 Authentication version of 
Barua et al.’s protocol 
Our proposed protocol
R(n) ªlog3 nº ªlog2 [(n+1)/2]º
B(n) 3u[(3¬log3 n¼-1)/2 +  
MIN(3¬log3 n¼, n-3¬log3 n¼ )] 
3u ª(n-1)/2º
P(n) (3¬log3 n¼u¬log3 n¼) + 
(n – 3¬
log
3
n¼)
¦  
n
i 1
(iu2i-1)+
[n-(2¬
log n¼-1)]u ¬log n¼
R(n): the rounds can be performed concurrently.   
B(n): the numbers of messages delivering.   
P(n): total numbers of pairings.   
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6. Conclusion 
We proposed a key agreement protocol based on 
weil pairing.  We use a complete binary tree to 
maintain a group key agreement process.  In this 
protocol, each user can authenticate the received 
messages and identity of user by ID-based 
authentication architecture.  It doesn’t need to perform 
the certificate of users’ public key and provides better 
efficiency.  We also propose two methods for member 
joining and leaving, it shows that our protocol is suit 
for dynamic member changing.  And our protocol fits 
in with some major security properties, which includes 
key authentication, forward secrecy, key compromise, 
known session key security and key control.   
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